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THE ANATOMY OF NOTICE
MAURICE H. ME1RULL*A T THE outset, it is well to confess what will be obvious to all those
/ whom curiosity combined with patience may lead to read this
- article, namely, my great indebtedness to Professor Warren A.
Seavey. His masterly analysis of the notice concept, first presented in
1916x and moulded into more exact form for the Restatement of Agency2
forms the foundation upon which anyone henceforth dealing with the sub-
ject must build. My own essay is limited to applying the analysis which
he worked out for agency purposes to the entire topic and to extending
it in respect to some minor matters not falling within the field to which
his attention was devoted.
I
A discerning legal system will have occasion to discriminate between
those acting unwittingly on the one hand, and, on the other, those who
have full knowledge, or who for some reason are treated by the law as
though they had it. In our system, the legal problems centering around
whether one should or should not be enrolled among the knowing are dealt
with under the title of Notice. 3 Agreement has been wanting, however, as
to both the analysis and the terminology of the subject. The views here
set forth are advanced with the hope that they may be of some service in
dispelling this confusion.
The simplest case, of course, is that of the man who is aware of the
facts with notice of which he is to be charged.4 In the language of some
* Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of Law.
Seavey, Notice through an Agent, 65 U. Pa. L. Rev. I (igi6). See also Seavey, Agency
(Part II), 2 Neb. L. Bul. 23-30 (1923).
2 Restatement, Agency § 9 (i933).
3 "Notice is knowledge, or information legally equivalent to knowledge, brought home to
the party notified in immediate connection with the subject to which the notice relates.'!
Black v. Roebuck, i7 Pa. Super. 324, 327 (Igo'). "Notice, generally, may be defined as that
which imports information of the fact to the one to be notified, and is divided by the law into
several classes, such as actual, constructive, implied, and presumptive notice." Burdine v.
*White, 173 Ky. 158, i6r, I9o S.W. 687, 689 (I917).
4 New York Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Central Union Bank, 65 F. (2d) 738 (C.C.A. 4 th
1933); Gray v. Winder, 77 Cal. 525, 20 Pac. 47 (i888); Bean & Symonds Co. v. Town of
Jaffrey, 8o N.H. 343, 117 Atl. 12 (1922); Fildew v. Milner, 57 Ore. 16, io9 Pac. 1092 (1910);
Fields v. Rust, 36 Tex. Civ. App. 350, 82 S.W. 331 (1904). Knowledge does not include reason-
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cases, he has "express information." s This may be because he was an
actor in the transaction or because it happened under his immediate
observation, but it is also common to say that one has knowledge of that
which has been communicated to him through a trustworthy source of
information. 6 In many instances, the term "actual notice" is employed
to designate the legal consequences arising out of knowledge of this type.7
Express notice has been used in this sense;8 as also direct or positive
notice. 9 Knowledge of this sort may, of course, be proved by direct evi-
dence,' 0 or its existence may be inferred from circumstantial evidence.-
One court has used the term implied actual notice to describe the drawing
able cause to know. Commonwealth v. Gould, 158 Mass. 499, 33 N.E. 656 (1893); Guernsey v.
Miller, 8o N.Y. 18i (i88o). Notice is, of course, a much broader term than knowledge,
Frazier v. Butler Borough, 172 Pa. 407, 33 Adt. 69i, 51 Am. St. Rep. 739 (1896).
s Hart's Devisees v. Hawkins' Heirs, 3 Bibb (Ky.) 502, 6 Am. Dec. 666 (1814); Miyhra v.
Rustad, 58 N.D. 258, 225 N.W. 796 (1929) (based on N.D. Comp. L. 1913 § 7288).
6 Witherow v. United American Ins. Co., ioi Cal. App. 334, 281 Pac. 668 (1929); Jordan v.
Pollock, 14 Ga. 145 (1853); Picklesimer v. Smith, 164 Ga. 6oo, 139 S.E. 72 (1927); Citizens &
Southern Bank v. Farr, 164 Ga. 88o, I39 S.E. 658 (1927); Little v. Schul, i8 Md. 454, 84
Atl. 649 (1912); Walkden's Case, 237 Mass. 115, 129 N.E. 396 (1921); Vaughn v. Tracy, 22
Mo. 415 (I856); Brown v. Connecticut Fire Ins. Co., 197 Mo. App. 317, 195 S.W. 62 (917);
Allen v. City of Millville, 87 N.J.L. 356, 95 At. 130 (1915); Ayers v. Public Service Co-ordi-
nated Transport, 12 N.J, Misc. 777, 174 At. 883 (1934).
The source of information must be trustworthy; bare rumor is insufficient. Parkhurst v.
Hosford, 2z Fed. 827 (C.C. Ore. 1884); Huffman v. Smith, 87 Colo. 265, 286 Pac. 861 (1 3o);
Richardson v. Smith, ix Allen (Mass.) 134 (1865); it re School Director, 73 Pitts. L. J. 597
(Pa. C. P. 1925); Green v. Amber Star Film Co., i R. I. Super. Ct. Rescr. 58 (iqxS).
In particular instances the word "knowledge" may be interpreted as requiring "first-hand"
experience, precluding information derived from other sources. Smith v. Industrial Accident
Commission, 174 Cal. 179, 162 Pac. 636 (1917).
7 In re Bowman, 36 F. (2d) 721 (C.C.A. 2d 1929); Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. Stamps, 48
Ga. App. 3o9, 172 S.E. 8o6 (1934); Funk v. Anchor Fire Ins. Co., 171 Ia. 331, 153 N.W. 1048
(19x5); Hutcherson v. Louisville & N.R.R., 247 Ky. 317, 57 S.W. (2d) 12 (1933); Vaughn v.
Tracy, 22 Mo. 415 (1856); Myhra v. Rustad, 58 N.D. 258, 225 N.W. 796 (1929); Epley v.
Witherow, 7 Watts (Pa.) 163 (1838); Wethered's Adm'r v. Boon, 17 Tex. 143 (1856); Hawley
v. Bullock, 29 Tex. 217 (1867). Closely akin is the term "notice in fact," Melms v. Pabst
Brew. Co., 93 Wis. 153, 66 N.W. S18 (1896).
$Farris v. Finnup, 84 Kan. 122, 113 Pac. 407 (1g"1); Hood v. Hood, 2 Grant (Pa.) 229
(1858); King v. Travis, 4 Hayw. (Tenn.) 280 (188); Rublee v. Mead, 2 Vt. 544 (1830);
Graff v. Castleman, 5 Rand. (Va.) 195, x6 Am. Dec. 741 (1827).
9 Masterson v. West End. N. G. R. R., 5 Mo. App. 64 (1878); Holmes v. Doe Run Lead Co.,
223 S.W. 772 (Mo. App. 1920).
10 Knapp v. Bailey, 79 Me. 195, 9 At. 122, 1 Am. St. Rep. 295 (1887); Drey v. Doyle, 99
Mo. 459, 12 S.W. 287 (1889); Link v. Jackson, 164 Mo. App. 195, '47 S.W. 1114 (X912).
x I-n re Wagner, iio Fed. 931 (D.C. Ky. igoi); Hall & Brown Wood Working Mach. Co. v.
Haley Furn. & Mfg. Co., '74 Ala. 19o, 56 So. 726, L.R.A. 19i8B, 924 ('gp"); Sapp v. Warner,
ioS Fla. 245, 143 So. 648 (1932); Knapp v. Bailey, note io supra; In re Brown, 228 Mass. 31,
116 N.E. 897 (1917); Drey v. Doyle, note io supra.
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of an inference of knowledge from circumstances. 2 Presumptive notice
has also been employed in this sense. 3
One who does not know a fact affecting his legal position may neverthe-
less be conscious of other facts so strongly indicating the existence of the
ultimate fact that a man of ordinary prudence would inquire concerning
it or conduct his business as though it existed.'4 In such a case he is af-
fected with notice of the ultimate fact. Many cases classify this as a form
of actual notice, 5 sometimes with the added epithet "implied."' 6 Others
simply speak of it as implied notice. 7 Another favorite descriptive term
is imputed notice,," and the phrase presumptive notice has been applied
to it. 9 It comes within a statutory requirement of "reasonable informa-
tion. '20 One case calls it "notional notice. "21 Another line of authorities
has classified notice of this type as constructive.2"
" Hall & Brown Wood Working Mach. Co. v. Haley Furn. & Mfg. Co., note ii supra.
'3 White v. Murphy, 3 Rich. L. (S.C.) 369 (1831).
'4 Compare Restatement, Agency § 9, Comment c (1933).
is Pique v. Arendale, 71 Ala. 9x (1881); Dewyer v. Dover, 222 Ala. 543, 133 So. 581 (193i);
Picklesimer v. Smith, 164 Ga. 6oo, 139 S.E. 72 (1927); Bowman-Boyer Co. v. Burgett, 195
Ia. 674, 192 N.W. 795 (1923); Beckwith v. Douglas, 25 Kan. 229 (1881); Kleis v. Katcef, 16o
Md. 627, 154 Ad. 558 (1931); Twitchell v. Glenwood-Inglewood Co., 131 Minn. 375, 155
N.W. 621 (1915); Sensenderfer v. Kemp, 83 Mo. 58i (1884); Smallwood v. Lewin, 15 N.J-
Eq. 6o (1862); Chelsea Exch. Bank v. Weinstein, 226 App. Div. 6oi, 236 N.Y.S. 185 (929);
Orr v. Reed, 5o Okla. 580, 151 Pac. 200 (i915); Blankenbuehler v. Herron, 2 Wash. Co. L. Rep.
162 (C.P. Pa. 1921); College Park Elec. Belt Line v. Ide, 15 Tex. Civ. App. 273, 40 S.W. 64
(1897); Farmers State Bank v. McCulley, 133 Wash. 364, 233 Pac. 661 (X925); Brinkman v.
Jones, 44 Wis. 498 (1878). Contra: Ross v. Irving, 14 Ill. 171 (1852); Parker v. Osgood, 3
Allen (Mass.) 487 (1862); Commonwealth v. Gould, 158 Mass. 499, 33 N.E. 656 (1893).
16 Sapp v. Warner, io5 Fla. 245, 141 So. 124, 143 So. 648 (1932); Farris v. Finnup, 84 Kan.
122, 113 Pac. 407 (19ii); Knapp v. Bailey, 79 Me. 195, 9 AtI. 122, i Am. St. Rep. 295 (1887);
Holmes v. Doe Run Lead Co., 223 S.W. 772 (Mo. App. 1920).
"7 Charles v. Roxana Pet. Corp., 282 Fed. 983 (C.C.A. 8th 1922); Rosen v. Wolff, 152 Ga.
578, iio S.E. 877 (1922); Kirkham v. Moore, 30 Ind. App. 549, 65 N.E. 1042 (1903); Johnson
v. Chicago, B. &Q.R.R., 202 Ia. 1282, 211 N.W. 842 (1929); Edwards v. Myers, 127 Kan. 221,
273 Pac. 468 (1929); Hutcherson v. Louisville & N.R.R., 247 Ky. 317, 57 S.W. (2d) 12 (i933);
Vaughn v. Tracy, 22 Mo. 415 (i856); Janvrin v. Janvrin, 6o N.H. i69 (x88o); H. C. Tack Co.
v. Ayers, 56 N.J. Eq. 56,38 Atl. 194 (1897); Plant v. Schrock, 102 Okla. 97, 227 Pac. 439 (1924);
Rublee v. Mead, 2 Vt. 544 (183o); Graff v. Castleman, 5 Rand. (Va.) 195, 16 Am. Dec. 741
(1827).
iIn re Manufacturers' Box & Lbr. Co., 251 Fed. 957 (D.C. N.J. 1918); Cleveland Woolen
Mills v. Sibert, 8i Ala. 140, i So. 773 (1887).
"H Hutcherson v. Louisville & N. R.R., 247 Ky. 317, 57 S.W. (2d) 12 (i933); Thomas v.
City of Flint, 123 Mich. 1o, 8z N.W. 936,47 L.R.A. 499 (igoo); Holmes v. Doe Run Lead Co.,
223 S.W. 772 (Mo. App. 1920); Reichert v. Neuser, 93 Wis. 513, 67 N.W. 939 (1896); perhaps
the term is used in this sense in Wilson v. Williams, 52 Miss. 487 (1876).
"0 Bennett v. Cocks, 15 Tex. 67 (I855). "1 King v. Travis, 4 H1ayw. (Tenn.) 280 (188).
"The Tompkins, 13 F. (2d) 552 (C.C.A. 2d 1926); Ponder v. Scott, 44 Ala. 241 (1870);
Wilkerson v. Thorp, 128 Cal. 224, 6o Pac. 679 (19oo) (based on Deering's Cal. Civ. Code
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The terminology of this subject is further complicated by the fact that
when a principal is affected by the knowledge of his agent, either of ulti-
mate facts or of facts stimulating inquiry, a number of courts hold that
the resultant effect upon the principal is to b(, called constructive notice23
It has also been characterized by the adjectives "implied '' 24 and "im-
puted.' ' 25 The better view, however, regards notice derived through an
agent as of the same variety that it would be if derived from personal
knowledge.2
6
For the sake of completeness, mention may be made at this point of
those situations where there is neither knowledge of the ultimate facts
nor of inquiry-provoking circumstances but in which one is nevertheless
treated as though he had full knowledge because he is under a duty volun-
tarily assumed, or imposed by law, to attain it. Thus a lawyer is under
an obligation to his client to have a grasp of the common legal principles
which constitute the normal learning of a reasonably skilled practitioner.
In tort law, one is often subject to a duty to use reasonable care in dis-
1931 § '9); Cummins v. Boston, 25 Ga. 277 (i858); Campe v. Cermak, 330 Ill. 463, 161 N.E.
761 (1928); Moreland v. Lemasters, 4 Blacki. (Ind.) 383 (1837); Allen v. McCalla, 25 Ia. 464,
96 Am. Dec. 56 (i868); Shell v. Guthrie, 129 Kan. 632, 284 Pac. 420 (i93o); Russell v. Petree,
io B. Mon. (Ky.) 184 (1849); Price v. McDonald, i Md. 403 (i851); Converse v. Blumrich,
14 Mich. iog (i866); Link v. Jackson, 158 Mo. App. 63, 139 S.W. 588 (1911); Buchanan v.
Balkum, 6o N.H. 406 (i88o) (ambiguous); Hoy v. Bramhall, ig N.J. Eq. 563, 97 Am. Dec.
687 (i868); Birdsall v. Russell, 29 N.Y. 220 (x864); Spencer v. Spencer, 56 N.C. 404 (1857);
Anderson v. City of Jamestown, So N.D. 531, i96 N.W. 753 (1924) (probably based on N.D.
Comp. L. 1913 § 7290); Cooper v. Flesner, 24 Okla. 47, 103 Pac. ioi6, 23 L.R.A. (N.S.) ii8o,
2o Ann. Cas. 29 (i9o9) (based on Oklahoma statutory provision which is now Harlow's Okla.
Stat. 1931 § 6x); Henry v. Brothers, 48 Pa. 70 (1864); Wethered's Adm'r v. Boon, 17 Tex. 143
(i856). In the following cases, constructive knowledge is employed in the same sense as is
the term constructive notice in the cases just cited: Friedman v. McGowan, i Penn. (Del.)
436, 42 Atl. 723 (i898); Brown v. Green, i Penn. (Del.) 535,42 Atl. 991 (1899); McCallum v.
Corn Prod. Co., 131 App. Div. 617, i16 N.Y.S. i18 (i9o9).
23 In re Wagner, iio Fed. 931 (D.C. Ky. x9oi); Hall & Brown Wood Working Mach. Co. v.
Haley Furn. & Mfg. Co., 174 Ala. 19o, 56 So. 726, L.R.A. i9i8B, 924 (i9ii); Westchester Fire
Ins. Co. v. Green, 223 Ala. 121, 134 So. 881 (193i); Atkinson v. Foote, 44 Cal. App. 149, i86
Pac. 831 (i919); Wiley v. Rome Ins. Co., 12 Ga. App. 186, 76 S.E. 1o67 (1913); Continental &
Commercial Trust & Savings Bank v. Lantry Constr. Co., x89 Ill. App. 296 (i914); Griffith v.
Griffith, i Hoff. Ch. (N.Y.) 152 (1839); Noble v. Echo Lake Tavern, 142 Misc. 427, 254
N.Y.S. 662 (193); Southern Travelers' Ass'n v. Boyd, I S.W. (2d) 446 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927);
Steinman v. Clinchfield Coal Co., 121 Va. 6xi, 93 S.E. 684 (1917).
24 Strahorn-Hutton-Evans Com. Co. v. Florer, 7 Okla. 499, 54 Pac. 710 (1898).
2s Tindale v. Bove, 97 Vt. 465, 124 Atl. 585 (1924).
26 There are many cases, mostly affirming the proposition by inference without discussion.
City of Denver v. Dean, io Colo. 375, 16 Pac. 30, 3 Am. St. Rep. 594 (1887); Prater v. Cox,
64 Ga. 7o6 (i88o); and Atkinson v. Elmore, i03 Mo. App. 403, 77 S.W. 492 (1903) will suffice
as representative citations.
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covering defects in machinery which he employs or in property under his
control. Logically, these come under our definition of Notice. Commonly
they are not so dealt with, perhaps for the reason that this would cause
an expansion of the topic comparable to the annexation of France and
Spain by the Andorran Republic. To round out our collection of phraseol-
ogy, however, it may be noted that every once in a while judges designate
a failure to know what one ought as constructive notice.27
In the situations we have been discussing, notice has the connotation
either of knowledge or of what should be known. Entirely different is an-
other sense in which it is employed, namely, to characterize those situa-
tions wherein one is charged, not because he knows something nor even
because he ought to have been cognizant of it, but simply because some
formal act has been done by another to which the law attaches the conse-
quence of notice. This is not notice in the sense of knowledge; it maybe
necessary in certain instances that it be formally communicated to the
person to be affected,2' but once that communication is made the noticee's
continued memory thereof is immaterial to its effectiveness;29 and if it is
brought about in some other way than by direct communication the
courts refuse to classify it as actual notice.1° Where direct communication
is unnecessary, the noticee will be bound although he has no knowledge
that the act creating notice has been performed.3' In some instances the
formal act is so important that knowledge of the existence of the facts
notice of which is to be given by the act is, by itself, ineffective; the act
is indispensable to the existence of notice.32
The variety of acts which may give rise to notice in this sense is pro-
tean. Notice may be given by formal statement;33 by the delivery of a
27 We need not burden ourselves with cumulative citations. Let these suffice: Bodholdt v.
Garrett, 122 Cal. App. 566, 1o P. (2d) 533 (1932); Madison County Com'rs v. Brown, 89 Ind.
48 (1883); Shopbell v. City of St. Joseph, 226 Mo. App. 1170, 49 S.W. (2d) 3o (I932).
28 Owens v. State, 74 Ala. 401 (1883); Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Farmers' Mut. Ins. Ass'n, 211
Ia. io5X, 233 N.W. 153 (ig3o); Commonwealth v. Conrad, 21 Berks Co. L.J. 156 (Q.S. Pa.
1928).
29 Newton v. Guerin, 279 Fed. 256 (C.C.A. 2d 1922).
30 Bailey v. Ford, 132 Ark. 203, 200 S.W. 797 (i9i8); Sumner v. Rhodes, 14 Conn. 135
(i84o); In re Shugar's Estate, 312 Pa. 472, 167 Atl. 567 (1933).
3t Crain v. Carter, i58 Ga. 428, 123 S.E. 699 (1924) (recorded deed); Mayweather v. Scott
County, 36 Ia. 143 (1872) (official proclamation-ditum); Town of Walpole v. Town of Hop-
kinton, 4 Pick. (Mass.) 358 (1826) (delivery of letter, lost without being read).
32 Walker v. Carrew, 56 Mo. App. 320 (1894); Cowie v. Harker, 32 S.D. 5i6, 143 N.W. 895(1913).
33 Owens v. State; Travellers' Ins. Co. v. Farmers' Mut. Ins. Ass'n; Commonwealth v.
Conrad; note 28 supra.
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document; 34 by mailing a letter;35 by occupancy of premises;36 by publica-
tion in the press;37 by posting a placard in some designated place; 35 by
registering a document in the public records;39 by maintaining litigation
in relation to property.40 The act may emanate from public authority,
as by the passage of a statute,4' or by the conduct of judicial proceedings,
which the parties to the litigation are said to be bound to notice.42 Except
in the case of formal communication, the term "actual notice," with its
connotation of knowledge of some sort, is inapplicable to these situa-
tions. 43 There is substantial judicial unanimity in characterizing them as
"constructive notice," 44 although one court has recently questioned the
technical accuracy of applying that appellation to notice by public
record.45
34 Town of Walpole v. Town of Hopkinton, supra note 3i; Granite Bank v. Ayers, 16
Pick. (Mass.) 392, 28 Am. Dec. 253 (1835).
3Ross v. Hawkeye Ins. Co., 83 Ia. 586, 5o N.W. 47 (18gi); Hughes v. Antietam Mfg. Co.,
34 Md. 316 (1871); People v. Albany Med. College, 26 Hun (N.Y.) 348 (1882).
36 Taylor v. Ballard, 41 Cal. App. 232, 182 Pac. 464 (igig); Hubbard v. Smith, 2 Mich. 207
(i851); Corey v. Smalley, io6 Mich. 257, 64 N.W. 13 (1895); Ranney v. Hardy, 43 Ohio St.
157, 1 N.E. 523 (x885).
37 York County Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Knight, 48 Me. 75 (186i); Bamrick v. Village of
Minatare, ii8 Neb. 644, 225 N.W. 755 (1929); Farleyv. Carpenter, 27 Hun (N.Y.) 359 (1882).
38 Coleman v. Spring Constr. Co., 41 Cal. App. 201, 182 Pac. 473 (1919).
39Arizona Land & Stock Co. v. Markus, 37 Ariz. 530, 296 Pac. 251 (i931); Booth v.
Barnum, 9 Conn. 286, 23 Am. Dec. 339 (1832); W. A. H. Church, Inc., v. Holmes, 6o App. D.C.
27, 46 F. (2d) 6o8 (i93r); Jordan v. Pollock, i4 Ga. 145 (z853); Case v. Bumstead, 24 Ind.
429 (i865); Masterson v. West End N.G.R.R., 5 Mo. App. 64 (1878); Hill v. Tissier, r5 Mo.
App. 299 (1884); Strahorn-Hutton-Evans Com. Co. v. Florer, 7 Okla. 499, 54 Pac. 710 (i898);
Hawley v. Bullock, 29 Tex. 217 (1867); Rublee v. Mead, 2 Vt. 544 (E830).
40 This is so-called notice by lis pendens. Regardless of what may be the correct view in the
controversy over whether the lis pendwns doctrine is properly referable to notice or to a public
policy in defense of the jurisdiction of courts, it is commonly referred to as constructive
notice and the effect of it is the same as though purchasers pendente lite were charged with
notice of the matters involved in the litigation. McWhorter v. Brady, 41 Okla. 383, 140 Pac.
782 (1914); Shelton v. Jackson, 4 Sneed (Tenn.) 672, 70 Am. Dec. 265 (1857); Maes v. Thomas,
140 S.W. 846 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911). In Garretson v. Brien, 3 Heisk. (Tenn.) 534 (1871) it is
termed "presumptive notice."
41 State v. Moreland, 152 Okla. 37, 3 P. (2d) 803 (ig3)-
4' Irving Trust Co. v. Spruce Apartments, 44 F. (2d) 218 (D.C. Pa. 193o); Mussman v.
Pepples, 243 Ky. 674, 49 S.W. (2d) 592 (1932).
43 Santa Rose Bank v. White, 139 Cal. 703, 73 Pac. 577 (19o3); also cases cited note 30
supra.
44 See cases cited in notes 33-42 supra, most of which were in part selected because of their
employment of this term.
4s "Strictly speaking, the term 'constructive notice' is applicable to extraneous facts which
are the subject of proof which may be rebutted. This is very different from notice under the
recording statutes. The principal object of requiring registration and the public record of
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II
Such is the anatomy of notice; such the confusion that characterizes its
nomenclature. The same term is applied to different varieties of notice;
several different names often attach to one type. Well may one echo the
words of Judge Selden and say, "But it will be found, on looking into the
cases, that there is much want of precision in the use of these terms." 46
Observing the logomachy-logorrhea perhaps would be the apter descrip-
tion-the writers have sought for some satisfactory analysis of the subject.
Mr. Justice Story recognized two classes of notice, actual and construc-
tive, defining the former as "knowledge of the fact .... brought directly
home to the party" and the latter as "evidence of notice the presumption
of which is so violent that the court will not even allow of its being contro-
verted."14 This distinction, particularly with respect to the definition of
constructive notice, has enjoyed a considerable popularity in American
courts. 4s As developed by the author, the result of the classification ap-
pears to be that only notice in the sense of personal knowledge comes
under the head of actual notice while constructive notice includes inquiry-
provoking facts, notice through an agent, notice by registry, lis pendens
and similar matters.49 Such a division of the field seems inadequate, first,
in failing to recognize that the notice arising from inquiry-provoking facts
may often be rebutted, either by showing the presence of other facts
allaying the suspicions that would normally have been raised,s" or by
showing that adequate inquiry, actually made, did not lead to knowl-
edge.51 In the second place, it fails to take into consideration that the
principles governing notice through an agent may vary, depending upon
whether the situation involves knowledge, or reason to know, upon the
judgments and liens is notice to all the world of their existence," W. A. H. Church, Inc., v.
Holmes, 6o App. D.C. 27, 30, 46 F. (2d) 6o8, 6zi ('93').
46 Wllliamson v. Brown, i N.Y. 354, 359 (1857).
4' See z Story, Equity Jurisprudence § 399 (i3th ed. 1886). This definition of constructive
notice, stemming from the words of Chief Baron Eyre in Plumb v. Fluitt, 2 Anst. 432, 438,
145 Eng. Rep. 926, 928 (1791), seems still to be approved in England. See 13 Halsbury's Laws
of England xo5 (2d ed. 1934).
48 An abbreviated list of cases employing this or similar language includes: Ex parte
Caplis, 275 Fed. 980 (D.C. Tex. 1921); Vaughn v. Tracy, 22 Mo. 4x5 (i856); Rogers v. Jones,
8 N.H. 264 (1836); Van Doren v. Robinson, 16 N.J. Eq. 256 (1863); Garrard v. Pittsburgh &
C.R.R., 29 Pa. 154 (1857); Briscoe v. Bronaugh, i Tex. 326, 46 Am. Dec. io8 (1846).
49 See Story, Equity Jurisprudence §§ 400-408.
so Thus the effect of possession in stimulating inquiry as to the possessor's title is usually
allayed by the fact that he has executed a conveyance to the premises. Clark v. Chapman, 213
Ia. 737, 239 N.W. 797 (i93)-
st Williamson v. Brown, note 46 supra.
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one hand, or notice arising out of a formal act upon the other hand. 2
Thirdly, it lumps together, under the head of actual notice, that notice
which is derived from personal information and that which results from
a formal communication, although, as we have seen, different principles
govern them. Finally, the line that is drawn seems to have no particular
significance, at least as it is applied. Let it be granted that in many
instances the circumstances surrounding facts placing one on inquiry are
such that the law will not listen to a denial of notice, i.e. the court is con-
vinced that due inquiry could not have failed to reveal the facts. That
does not seem to be any reason for grouping notice derived in that manner,
which is, after all, still dependent upon the mental state of the noticee or
his agent, with that notice arising from the formal act of someone else,
the effectiveness of which is entirely independent of such psychological
phenomena. On the other hand, there is every reason for classifying it
with notice in the sense of knowledge, to which it is so closely akin.
Professor Pomeroy avoids the first objection to Mr. justice Story's
classification, partly by an ingenious though artificial explanation of some
of the decisions upon inquiry-provoking facts as involving a fact-inference
of the existence of knowledge, built upon a presumption that inquiry
actually was made,13 partly by defining constructive notice to include
cases in which the legal presumption of notice may be overcome by proof
of investigation, diligent but unsuccessful S4 Otherwise his system follows
the Story formula and is open to the same objections. Further, the distinc-
tion between the inference of actual notice from facts putting one on
inquiry and the constructive notice arising from such facts is tenuous,
difficult in application, and without any very apparent significance in its
results.
Professor Bispham, in a classification which has received considerable
judicial approbation, moved inquiry-provoking facts over into the cate-
gory of actual notice under the heading of "indirect, implied or presump-
live notice,""s still keeping, as the test of constructive notice, its irrebut-
table nature56 The symmetry of his classification is marred by the inclu-
sion of notice through an agent under the head of constructive notice57
s For these principles, see Restatement, Agency, c. 8 (1933).
S3 2 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence §§ 596-602 (3d ed. x9o5).
s4 " 'Constructive' notice includes all other instances in which the information thus directly
communicated cannot be shown, but the information is either coclutsively presumed to have
been given and received from the existence of certain facts, or is implied by a primafacie pre-
sumption of the law in the absence of contrary proof." 2 Pomeroy, id., § 971.
ss Bispham, Principles of Equity 458 (9 th ed. 295).
s
6 Bispham, id., 459- sBispham, id., 460.
THE ANATOMY OF NOTICE
and by a later reversion, influenced by the oft-quoted language of Wig-
ram, V.C. in Jones v. Smith,58 to the position that facts stimulating inquiry
are to be classified as constructive notice.59 He failed to distinguish be-
tween the effect of possession as a fact provoking inquiry and the main-
tenance of possession as a formal act affecting subsequent purchasers or
incumbrancers with notice of the possession. 60 While his recognition of
the kinship between knowledge and facts putting one upon inquiry marks
an advance, its effect is weakened by the inconsistency mentioned in the
second preceding sentence, and his system is open to the second and the
third criticisms that have been brought against the Story classification.
Mr. Wade's work6 was an essay at dealing with the subject of Notice
as a unit, dissociated from its early position as a ward of the courts of
chancery. He recognized clearly the kinship between knowledge and facts
arousing inquiry, placing them both under the head of actual notice,
denominating the first express and the second implied.62 He blurred this
distinction slightly by a later statement that implied notice "is circum-
stantial evidence, from which the jury, after estimating its value, may
infer notice."6 3 This comes dangerously close to Pomeroy's theory of
knowledge inferred from circumstantial evidence, a radically different
thing from facts stimulating investigation. Some of his examples seem to
reflect this confusion.14 On the whole, however, his category of implied
actual notice seems intended to embrace facts placing one upon inquiry.
Wade further recognizes that notice through an agent is "governed to a
considerable extent by the rules applicable to actual notice,"6 s paving the
way for taking out of the category of constructive notice the cases in which
the principal is affected with notice because of his agent's knowledge. 6
In the class of constructive notice, Wade, while at times inclined to revert
to the notion of including inquiry-provoking facts, 67 places chief emphasis
upon notice arising out of formal acts whose effect as notice is prescribed
either by comon law68 or by statute.69 The main objections to his system
s' I Hare 43, 55 (1841). 'a Wade, id., § 5.
59 Bispham, op. cit. supra note 55, 464-466. 63 Wade, id., § 8.
1, Bispham, id., 464. 64 Wade, id., §§ 10, 25.
61 Wade, Notice (1878). 65 Wade, id., § 31.
""Whether, therefore, the notice by which the principal is to be affected is actual or con-
structive depends upon the manner in which it is brought home to the agent. If the agent has
actual notice, the principal is charged with notice of the same kind. If the agent is constructive-
ly notified, so is the principal." Wade, id., § 672. See also §§ 673, 673a.
67 Wade, id., §§ 42, 42a, 45, 46, 47.
"1 Wade, id., §§ 41 (Uis pendens), 43 (contents of document formally executed), 44 (pos-
session).
69 Wade, id., § 41 (registration laws, publication).
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lie in its inconsistencies, in the failure to recognize that direct communica-
tion (to Wade, a variety of actual notice7 ) may be one form of notice
effective because of the performance of formalities, and in an inadequate
recognition of the significance of notice by formal act in the analysis of
the notice concept.
Mr. Tiffany, after calling attention to the confusion reigning in the
cases and the text books, suggested that the distinction between actual
and constructive notice should be made to turn upon whether notice was
dependent upon information possessed by the person to be charged, in
which event he would call it actual notice, or whether it was imposed, re-
gardless of information, by a common law rule or by statute, to which he
would give the name constructive notice.77 Constructive notice, that is,
would be fictitious knowledge. If one is to divide notice into actual and
constructive, this seems a very pertinent suggestion, inasmuch as the term
constructive in our juridical nomenclature commonly denotes a fiction
arising out of a legal rule. The inadequacy of such a classification, how-
ever, is illustrated by the application which Mr. Tiffany makes of it.
Logically enough, he places knowledge and facts placing one on inquiry
in the department of actual notice. He feels required by his definition to
put notice of the contents of unknown or unexamined instruments in one's
chain of title and notice through an agent under the head of constructive
notice. The first seems more properly to belong in the category of inquiry-
suggestive facts, since the purchaser knows that a chain of title exists
and common prudence would incite an examination of its contents. The
second, as we have seen, may or may not be entitled to treatment as
notice dependent upon knowledge or arising out of the dictates of pru-
dence 72
The truth is that the distinction between notice actual and construc-
tive, involving as it does emphasis upon the noticee's state of mind, tends
to discount the significance of formal notice. In all the analyses employing
this distinction, the notice through formal communication is grouped with
the notice arising out of information present in the mind of the person
affected, under the style of actual notice. Yet the principles governing
th& two are radically different. The uncertainty and confusion we have
observed anent the proper labelling of vicarious notice, of inquiry provok-
70 Wade, id., § 7.
1Tiffany, Real Property § 573 (2d ed. 192o).
72Completeness probably requires mention of a threefold division of notice into actual, im-
plied and constructive, found in 5 Thompson, Real Property § 4189 (1924). It is not well de-
veloped..
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ing fact, of notice through possession, of notice through documents, all
seem traceable to overemphasis upon what may be termed the subjective
factor in notice and a corresponding underemphasis of the formal element.
Most of the significant differences in the law of this subject seem to center
about this cleavage between notice based in some manner upon knowledge
and notice which is founded on formality. Doubtless it might be possible
so to restate our definitions as to make the adjectives actual and construc-
tive adequate to describe this cleavage. The uncertain and conflicting
manner in which they have been used heretofore, however, has created
so much ambiguity that it would seem better to seek a new terminology
to fit the revised analysis of the subject.
III
In 1916 Professor Seavey first presented the new analysis. Pointing
out clearly the distinction between notice based on knowledge and notice
arising from performance of an act, he termed the first "notice which
means knowledge" and the second "absolute notice." 3 He did not go
exhaustively into the elements of knowledge-notice but in a later article
he made it clear that he included in that class the notice arising out of
inquiry-provoking facts.7 4 Absolute notice5 included notice through
formal communication brought home to the noticee76 notice by record77
or by publication 78 or by any other formal act recognized by the law as
sufficient.
As developed by Professor Seavey and his advisers in the Restatement
of Agency, after passing through a stage wherein knowledge became a
generic term including inquiry-provoking facts and situations involving
a duty of knowledge and absolute notice was transmuted into notifica-
tion,7 9 the analysis now enumerates knowledge, reason to know (inquiry-
stimulating facts), duty to know and notification (notice based on formal-
ity), as the elements of notice, notification being so defined as to cover
all the situations wherein notice is derived from the performance of some
73 Seavey, Notice through an Agent, 65 U. Pa. L. Rev. i (r916).
74 Seavey, Agency (Part II), 2 Neb. L. Bul. No. 1, 5, 24 (1923).
75 The term was taken from Wade, Notice 72 (2d ed. 1886); Bigelow, Fraudulent Convey-
ances 598 (2d ed. x9ii). It also occurs in 2 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence 1007, 1o8, 1022,
1043, io46, 1051, 1xo9, rio (igo5), to denominate a notice that cannot be destroyed by any
proof as to want of knowledge. See also Coy v. Gaye, 84 S.W. 441, 443 (TeX. Civ. App. 19o4).
26 See Seavey, op. cit. supra note 73, 5.
77 Id., at 2.
79 Id., at 3.
79 See Restatement, Agency (Tent. Draft No. 5), c. 12 (1930).
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act, whether that act be formally bringing home information of a fact or
posting a placard on a fence s o
This analysis avoids the criticism that it has been necessary to make
concerning the earlier systems. How splendidly it is adapted to stating
the legal rules governing notice may be seen in the chapter on notice
through agents in the Agency Restatement. 8' However, with all defer-
ence to the authority from which it emanates, it appears to me capable
of improvement in certain respects.
In the first place, I would suggest a revival of the division of notice
into two (not three) parts. This division I would make, not on the basis
of the cleavage between notification on the one hand and knowledge and
its related concepts on the other, but on the basis of a distinction between
the situations in which notice is dependent upon the noticee's awareness,
at the time the notice is to be effective, of the facts constituting it, and
those in which it is not thus dependent. For the latter, I would revive
the term applied by Professor Seavey in 1916 to what he has called noti-
fication in the Restatement, i.e. absolute notice.12 The former, in default
of a more euphonious designation, I venture to call by the barbarous
name of cognitive notice. The desirability of this classification rests upon
the fact that there are one or two situations in the law of notice that I
believe can best be explained by such a classification.
The first situation involves what, for want of better words, I have
termed unforgettable knowledge. While ordinarily, where knowledge or
reason to know is involved, as distinguished from notification, one is
bound by notice only so long as he holds in memory the facts by which
he is to be affected,5 3 there are certain situations in which the law will not
8o "() A person has notice of a fact if he or his agent knows the fact, has reason to know
it, should know it, or has been given a notification of it.
(2) A person is given notification by another if the latter (a) informs him of the fact or
of other facts from which he has reason to know or should know the fact; or (b) does an act
which, under the rules applicable to the transaction, has the same effect on the legal relations
of the parties as the acquisition of knowledge." Restatement, Agency § 9 (i933). The com-
ment to this section explains the meaning of the terms employed at some length, but I believe
my statement in the text fairly reflects the meaning of this analysis.
81 Restatement, Agency, c. 8 (i933).
82 See Seavey, Notice through an Agent, 65 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 2 (i916).
83 Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Flemming, 65 Ark. 54, 44 S.W. 464, 39 L.R.A. 789, 67 Am. St. Rep.
9oo (I8g8); Goodwin v. Dean, 5o Conn. 517 (1883); Cox v. Milner, 23 111.476 (r86o); Gray v.
Woods, 4 Blackf. (Ind.) 432 (1837); Lytle's Ex'r v. Pope's Adm'r, ii B. Mon. (Ky.) 297
(1851); Parker v. Prescott, 86 Me. 241, 29 Ati. 1007 (1894); Wheelock v. Postal Tel. Cable Co.,
,97 Mass. 119, 83 N.E. 313, 14 Ann. Cas. i88 (I9o8); Norton v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
74 Minn. 484, 77 N.W. 298, 300 (1898); Tong. v. Matthews, 23 Mo. 437 (I856); Green v.
Morgan, 21 At. 857 (N.J. Ch. 18gi); Larson v. Clough, 55 N.D. 634, 214 N.W. 904 (1927);
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let a man forget what once he knew. The cases are too numerous for de-
tailed treatment here but a few examples may be given to illustrate the
point. In a state following the majority rule refusing to impose liability
upon a banker for misappropriations by a fiduciary-depositor merely be-
cause the deposit was created by a check drawn or indorsed by the
fiduciary in his trust capacity,4 a duty is imposed upon the bank to re-
member the source of the deposit. It cannot accept payment therefrom
of the fiduciary's individual debt to it. 85 If it does so, in some jurisdictions
it must thereafter remember the misappropriation and is charged with
liability for all money wrongfully disbursed by the fiduciary from that
date.86 Knowledge acquired in connection with the first of a series of
transactions is held very frequently to affect the person acquiring it in
his conduct of business later in the series, although lapse of time or other
factors indicate that it is no longer held in memory.8 7 A party to a law-
suit cannot toll the time for attacking a decision whose rendition occurred
in his presence and hearing by forgetting about what was done.8 In
various situations the importance of information acquired seems to lead
the court to deny one the privilege of plunging insouciantly into Lethean
waters. 9 In all these cases the notice springs from knowledge possessed
at one time by the party charged, not from any act performed to affect
him with notice. Hence it is impossible to account for them upon the
Morris v. Daniels, 35 Oh. St. 406 (188o); Epley v. Witherow, 7 Watts (Pa.) 163 (1838);
Merchants' & Planters' National Bank v. Clifton Mfg. Co., 56 S.C. 320, 33 S.E. 750 (1899);
Kirklin v. Atlas Sav. & L. Ass'n, 6o S.W. 149 (Tenn. Ch. App. 19oo); Stephens v. Herron, 99
Tex. 63, 87 S.W. 326, ii44 (i9o5); Vest v. Michie, 3i Grat. (Va.) 149, 31 Am. Rep. 722
(1878).
S4 See Scott, Participation in a Breach of Trust, 34 Harv. L. Rev. 454 (1921); Merrill,
Bankers' Liability for Deposits of a Fiduciary to His Personal Account, 40 Harv. L. Rev. 1077
(1927).
85 United States F. & G. Co. v. Union Bank, 228 Fed. 448 (C.C.A. 6th 1915); Haase v.
Danisch, 268 Ill. App. 281 (1932); Allen v. Puritan Trust Co., 211 Mass. 409, 97 N.E. 916,
L.R.A. x915C, S18 (1912).
86 Bischoff v. Yorkville Bank, 218 N.Y. io6, 112 N.E. 759, L.R.A. 19i6F, io5g; Harden v.
State Bank of Goldendale, 118 Wash. 234, 203 Pac. 16 (1922).
87 National Bank of North America v. Thomas, 30 R.I. 294, 74 At. 1092 (i9io); Springfield
F. & M. Ins. Co. v. Whatley, 279 S.W. 287 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925).
89 Gulf Production Co. v. Palmer, 230 S.W. 1017 (Tex. Civ. App. i921).
89 Runyon v. Smith, i8 Fed. 579 (C.C. Mich. 1883); Christie v. Sherwood, 113 Cal. 526,
45 Pac. 820 (1896); Cushman v. Illinois Starch Co., 79 IRI. 281 (1875); Greenlee v. Smith, 4
Kan. App. 733, 46 Pac. 543 (1896); Bank of America v. McNeil, io Bush (Ky.) 54 (1873);
Rossman v. Ward, 210 Mich. 426, 178 N.W. 41 (1920); Bramhall v. Hutchinson, 42 N.J. Eq.
372, 7 At. 873 (i886); Susquehanna Line v. Auditore, 223 App. Div. 585, 229 N.Y.S. 18i
(1928); Teutonia Ins. Co. v. BusseU, 48 S.W. 703 (Tenn. Ch. App. 1897).
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familiar ground that the effectiveness of notification, once given, is not
destroyed by subsequent forgetfulness.90 The only adequate explanation
seems to be that in these situations a policy of the law, based on that
standard of reasonable conduct upon which juristic science so frequently
leans, forbids people to lapse into carefree inattention."'
This concept of unforgettable knowledge appears to have some useful-
ness in dealing with a vexed problem in the law of agency, to-wit, how
far a principal is affected, in his present transactions, by the knowledge of
a former agent no longer in his employ.92 If the information received by
the agent is such that the principal, receiving it himself, could safely for-
get it, he should not be bound by the knowledge of one no longer his
agent.93 In such a case, if the agent, continuing in the employment, had
forgotten his former learning, the principal would not be affected;94 it
would be most inconsistent to deny a similar effect to the agent's quitting
his job. On the other hand, if the knowledge is of the unforgettable
variety, the principal, being affected by the agent's acquisition thereof,
can hardly be relieved by the subsequent close of their relations.95 As fre-
quently happens in close cases, not all the decisions can be reconciled
with this analysis, but it seems to me a more satisfactory way of explain-
ing the greater part of them than to make it rest upon the existence or
non-existence of a duty to reveal the information acquired. 96 The presence
or absence of the duty may be important in determining whether the
agent's knowledge affects the principal with notice at all;97 the continu-
9o See cases cited note 29 supra.
91 For a more detailed examination of the cases of unforgettable knowledge, see Merrill
Unforgettable Knowledge, 34 Mich. L. Rev. 474 (I936).
92 The difficulties of the subject may be appreciated by looking at the toilsome examination
thereof in 73 A.L.R. 416 (1931).
93 " re Hereford, 229 Fed. 863 (D.C. W.Va. 1916); Murray v. Preferred Acc. Ins. Co., ig
Ia. 1195, 2o N.W. 595 (1925); Hackett v. Catholic Benev. Legion, 168 N.Y. 588, 6o N.E.
1112 (IgoI).
94 In re Hereford, 229 Fed. 863 (D.C. W.Va. 1916); Strohecker v. Mutual B. & L. Ass'n,
55 Nev. 350, 34 P. (2d) 1076 (i934).
95 Birmingham Trust & Savings Co. v. Louisiana National Bank, 99 Ala. 379, 13 So. 112,
2o L.R.A. 6oo (I892); Iowa Universalist Convention v. Howell, 218 Ia. 1143, 254 N.W. 848
(1934); Loring v. Brodie, 134 Mass. 453 (1883); United States National Bank v. Forstedt, 64
Neb. 855, 90 N.W. 919 (1902).
96 See Restatement, Agency § 275, comment e (1933) for a solution of the problem on this
basis.
97 This seems to be the explanation of Blackburn v. Vigors L.R., 12 App. Cas. 531, 13 Eng.
Rul. Cas. 514 (1887), apparently the source of the second illustration given in support of the
comment in the Restatement of Agency cited supra note 96. It likewise explains such cases
as Irvine v. Grady, 85 Tex. 120, 19 S.W. 1o28 (1892).
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ance of the notice after cessation of the employment should depend upon
whether the principal, himself possessing full knowledge, would be bound
to hold it in memory.
It may be suggested that the category of unforgettable knowledge as
here outlined is merely the concept treated in the Restatement of Agency
under the title of "should know."9 That suggestion does not seem ac-
ceptable. The examples given under that heading clearly indicate that
the framers of the Restatements had in mind situations wherein one is
under a duty to others to acquire knowledge. In unforgettable knowledge
situations, per contra, there is normally no duty to acquire knowledge in
the first place;99 the obligation is to retain it after it has been received.
There is this likeness between the "should know" and the unforgettable
knowledge situations, that both cast notice upon the person affected with-
out regard to whether he is, at the time, aware of the matters with notice
of which he is charged. For this reason I would place them, along with
notification, under the rubric of absolute notice.
Another point in connection with which the distinction between cogni-
tive and absolute notice seems to be useful is illustrated by cases like
M1ferchants' National Bank v. Detroit Trust Company.0 0 In most cases, if
A formally communicates to B his claim to certain property, for the
express purpose of warning B to govern his action accordingly, B there-
after cannot by purchasing the property cut out A's claim, though B may
in fact have forgotten the warning."" In other words, such a formal com-
munication is a notification to B of A's rights. Where commercial instru-
ments, such as negotiable bonds, are involved, however, most courts hold
that if B forgets that he has been informed by A of the latter's claim he
may purchase without being affected thereby.'' Whether these cases,
resting upon a supposed policy in favor of the freedom of business men and
investors to acquire such paper, are "sound" may be open to doubt,0 3 but
98 Restatement, Agency § 9, comment d (1933).
99 See the cases cited notes 84-89 supra.
'00 258 Mich. 526, 242 N.W. 739, 85 A.L.R. 350 (1932).
o1 Smith v. J. R. Newberry Co., 21 Cal. App. 432, 13x Pac. 1055 (1913); Hookaia v.
Kealoha, 30 Haw. 446 (1928); Kithcart v. Kithcart, 145 Ia. 549, 124 N.W. 305, 30 L.R.A.
(N.S.) 1o62 (igio); see Whitecotton v. Wilson, 197 S.W. 168 (Mo. App. 1917); Parker v.
Prescott, 86 Me. 241, 29 Ad. 1007, 1oo8 (1894).
- Merchants! National Bank v. Detroit Trust Co., note zoo supra; Seybel v. National
Currency Bank, 54 N.Y. 288, 13 Am. Rep. 583 (1873); Lord v. Wilkinson, 56 Barb. (N.Y.)
593 (187o); and see Vermilye v. Adams Express Co., 21 Wall. (U.S.) 138, 146, 22 L. Ed. 6og,
612 (1875). Contra: Northwestern National Bank v. Madison & Kedzie State Bank, 242 Il.
App. 22 (1926); cf. Hinckley v. Union Pac. R.R., 129 Mass. 52, 37 Am. Rep. 297 (i88o).
"'3 See Merrill, The Wages of Indifference, io Temple L. Q. i47 (1936).
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they are there and must be fitted into our classification. One way would
be simply to say that they treat A's attempted notification as being no
more than knowledge, but it seems to me to make matters a little clearer
if we focus attention upon the fact that A's communication was definitely
for the purpose of notifying B concerning A's claim. We can do this by
saying that the communication is a notification which need not be re-
membered, grouping it, together with knowledge and inquiry-arousing
facts under the title cognitive notice.
For these reasons, I prefer to analyze the concept of notice according
to the following classification:
I. Cognitive Notice
A. Knowledge
B. Facts putting one on inquiry (reason to know)
C. Notification which need not be remembered
II. Absolute Notice
A. Notification
i. by formal communication
2. by performance of an act giving notice (i.e. recording, publication, posting,
legislation, juristic formulation of legal rules, etc.)
B. Unforgettable Knowledge
C. Facts which One is Under Duty to Know
This scheme is put forward with diffidence, in respect to those details
wherein it differs from that set out in the Restatement of Agency, but, to
one mind at least, it appears to offer advantages over the latter.
